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The “Inner Kowtow Controversy” during the Amherst Embassy 
to China (1816-1817) 
 
 
The Amherst embassy has long been viewed as a diplomatic failure in Britain’s early 
relations with China. This article concentrates on the greatly overlooked aspect of the 
Amherst mission – the controversy within the embassy’s leadership about whether to perform 
kowtow before the Jiaqing emperor. George Thomas Staunton, basing his arguments on some 
“local inside knowledge”, successfully prevailed on Amherst to refuse to kowtow. This 
decision directly resulted in the rejection of the embassy from Beijing. To explain this 
unpleasant outcome, both sides of the controversy downplayed the importance of their 
decision and, instead, constructed a capricious image of the Chinese emperor, which helped 
to lay the foundations for the deterioration of Sino-British relations in the run up to the 
Opium War. 
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Modern historiography of early Sino-British relations primarily focuses on two events: the 
kowtow controversy during the Macartney embassy (1792-4) and the outbreak of the First 
Anglo-Chinese War (the “Opium War”, 1839-42). The major British contact with China 
between these two incidents, the Amherst embassy of 1816-17, has been largely neglected by 
historians. Dispatched twenty-two years after the unsuccessful Macartney embassy, the 
Amherst mission has traditionally been regarded as more fruitless than the former, mainly 
because Lord Amherst did not even achieve an audience with the Chinese emperor. Largely 
for this reason, unlike Macartney’s mission which has attracted much scholarly attention, 
very little work has been done on the Amherst embassy and, where it has been mentioned, the 
evidence provided is rather brief and is largely descriptive.1 It was not until recently that 
Patrick Tuck and the author of this article started to point out that the Amherst mission is 
worthy of closer study and the failure to investigate the complexity of this event has left 
much valuable information unexplored.2 In particular, because of the neglect of the Amherst 
mission, the Macartney embassy has commonly been believed to be the only event of 
significance before the Opium War. Nevertheless, since members of the Macartney embassy 
considered it inappropriate to abandon the policy of currying favour with the Chinese 
emperor,3 when historians have analysed the origins of the Opium War, they have found no 
strong links between the views of leading war agitators in the 1830s and the attitude held by 
members of the early British embassies to China. 
        Although an in-depth investigation into the Amherst embassy can offer new insights into 
the deterioration of British-Chinese relations in the pre-Opium War era, little effort has been 
made to explore precisely what happened during the mission. Two doctoral dissertations, by J. 
Eastberg and Zhang Shunhong respectively, have attempted to examine the Amherst embassy 
from a perceptional point of view, 4  but neither of them has explored how these British 
perceptions of China were related to the later mode of engagement between the two countries. 
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Moreover, because Amherst’s refusal to kowtow to the Jiaqing emperor has been regarded as 
the main reason for the embassy’s failure, some East Asian scholars have attempted to study 
this renewed kowtow controversy from the Chinese perspective.5 Important inner workings of 
the Amherst embassy, however, remain under-researched. In particular, little attention has 
been paid to a major difference between the Amherst and the Macartney embassies – When 
Macartney was visiting China, no one in his mission had had prior experience of that country. 
Unassisted by any “local inside knowledge”, Macartney had to make most of the decisions 
himself. Amherst, however, had an advisory team consisting of a group of the East India 
Company’s employees in Canton. George Thomas Staunton, then president of the Select 
Committee, was appointed as the second commissioner and minister plenipotentiary of the 
embassy. Other persons such as Robert Morrison, John Francis Davis, Francis Toone, 
Thomas Manning and Alexander Pearson all had a command of the Chinese language and 
had lived in Canton and Macao for extended periods of time. Since these EIC staff members 
had had experience dealing with the Chinese authorities at Canton, Amherst, instead of 
relying entirely on his own judgment, sometimes felt obliged to solicit opinions from these 
so-called “China experts”. Although there was little disagreement between Amherst and these 
EIC employees on most of the proceedings of the mission, on some occasions, they did 
indeed entertain different aspirations and held contrasting attitudes. These subtle but critical 
differences of opinion, as well as the impact of these EIC staff members on the proceedings 
of the embassy, have been mentioned briefly by Tuck in his introductory essay,6 but were 
never seriously researched by any historian. In particular, previous scholars have failed to 
examine the “inner kowtow controversy” by adopting a similar approach to that which James 
Polachek used in his book, The Inner Opium War,7 which explores the behind-the-scenes 
political struggles within the Qing court that shaped China’s foreign policy in the 1830s and 
1840s. This important disagreement within the Amherst embassy, on whether or not to 
4 
THE “INNER KOWTOW CONTROVERSY” 
 
 
kowtow before the Jiaqing emperor, was in fact an early example of the collision between the 
appeasing and the hard-line diplomatic attitudes that Britain ought to adopt towards China. 
Amherst’s decision to adopt an uncompromising stance, as strongly demanded by Staunton, 
not only directly resulted in the rejection of the embassy from Beijing, but encouraged many 
Britons thereafter to dispute the necessity of persisting in the deferential posture towards 
China that had been advocated by Macartney. In this sense, therefore, the Amherst embassy 
should not be viewed simply as an insignificant diplomatic failure. To a great extent, it 
provides a vital link connecting the Macartney embassy and the Opium War in the progress 
of British-Chinese relations, by laying the foundations for the increasingly belligerent attitude 
adopted by Britain in the lead-up to the Opium War.  
        Eleven members of the Amherst mission have left us more than fifteen accounts of their 
visit to China. Although Amherst’s diary was lost because of the shipwreck of the embassy’s 
main ship, the Alceste, on its return voyage, some of Amherst’s observations on China can 
still be found in the India Office Library and Records held in the British Library. The second 
and third commissioners of the embassy, George Thomas Staunton and Henry Ellis, produced 
several works on the mission after they returned to Britain. Other members of the embassy 
also kept or published journals of their visit to China. These individuals include: Robert 
Morrison and John Francis Davis, who both served as translators to the embassy; Clarke Abel, 
the chief medical officer and naturalist; John Macleod, a surgeon aboard the Alceste; Basil 
Hall, the commander of HMS Lyra; and Henry Hayne, Amherst’s private secretary. 
        Despite the existence of these materials, historians have not revealed the complex 
reasons for launching the Amherst embassy. The prevailing explanation for the occasion of 
this mission is clear and straightforward. Christopher Hibbert maintains that “neither the 
merchants at Canton nor the British government were content to let matters rest where the 
failure of Lord Macartney’s mission had left them; and on the death of the old Emperor 
5 
THE “INNER KOWTOW CONTROVERSY” 
 
 
Ch’ien-lung [Qianlong] in 1799 hope was revived that a satisfactory trade agreement might 
be negotiated”.8 Alain Peyrefitte claims that “the British, having vanquished Napoleon, now 
had the means – and the need – to try one last diplomatic approach”,9 in order to place 
Britain’s commercial and political relations with China on a secure footing. These arguments 
have indicated the consistency between the two British missions, but they have overlooked 
the different expectations entertained by the East India Company and the British government.  
        In the two decades after the Macartney embassy, according to Staunton, British citizens 
in Canton were “neither protected by the physical force of armies, nor by that moral security 
which is derived from the plighted faith of treaties”.10 Their trade continued to be overseen by 
the “highly jealous, despotic, and arbitrary” 11  government of Canton. The East India 
Company’s trade monopoly in India, except for the tea trade and trade with China, was 
terminated in 1813. As a result, its commerce with China became more important than ever to 
the Company. Given the perceived character of the local Chinese authorities, the EIC’s Select 
Committee at Canton believed that, in order to maintain its China trade, there was a serious 
need to appeal directly to the imperial court in Beijing. Under such circumstances, the EIC’s 
Court of Directors in London pleaded to the British government for a royal ambassador to be 
sent to the Qing court. The Amherst embassy, in consequence, was formed at the request of 
and at the expense of the East India Company. 
        It can be seen that the Amherst mission was initiated primarily by the EIC’s anxiety 
about the preservation of its China trade, rather than because of any broader design of the 
British government to develop further its relations with the Chinese court. For the EIC, the 
trade in Canton was its only concern, because experience had shown that nothing more could 
be expected under the current circumstances. Staunton even maintained that the embassy 
“was sent out for the single purpose of settling the Canton disputes and re-establishing the 
trade”.12 This sentiment, however, did not entirely coincide with the expectations of the 
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British government. In addition to the EIC’s objective to defend its commerce in Canton, the 
government wished that, “every opportunity should be taken to enquire how the purchase of 
British manufactured goods in China could be increased”.13 This difference between the 
objectives of the British government and the EIC did not seem remarkable at the beginning, 
but it turned out to be increasingly significant as the Amherst mission proceeded.  
        Once Staunton joined the embassy in July 1816 off the China coast, it can be seen that he 
was keen to stress that his advice was pivotal to the embassy. It was Staunton’s belief that, 
“from my local experience, and from habits of long and deep reflection upon it, I ought to be 
fully prepared to offer a well-grounded opinion”.14 In his Miscellaneous Notices, Staunton 
even implied that Amherst’s opinion was in no way superior to his, while all decisions ought 
to have been made collectively. He wrote: 
 
the principle upon which this embassy was constituted, was extremely judicious. 
– The appointment of a commission in which a nobleman was to preside, with two 
members of the select committee for his assessors, combined two very essential 
requisites upon the occasion, which it was impossible to find centred in any one 
individual, in an equal degree. 15 
 
Moreover, because this mission was dispatched chiefly for the wellbeing of the EIC’s 
merchants in Canton, Staunton argued that serious attention should also have been paid to the 
opinions of other EIC’s representatives. To justify this standpoint, he asserted that:  
 
It [the embassy] grew so entirely out of the measures which had been adopted by 
the Company’s authorities there … and was so especially designed to strengthen 
their hands, and to obtain, if possible, the emperor’s confirmation of the 
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provincial adjustment which they had already obtained … any scheme of an 
embassy which had not included persons who were locally, and in the fullest 
manner acquainted, both with what had been done, and with what was still 
required, would, however complete in other respects, have been obviously worse 
than useless. 16 
 
        The reason why Staunton attached so much importance to his own advice and that of 
other EIC staff was that he did not think the Amherst embassy had arrived at a good time. 
Staunton maintained that the Company had requested an embassy to be dispatched “when the 
alarm for the safety of the trade was at the highest”.17 This situation had changed considerably, 
however, by the time that the Select Committee at Canton was informed that an embassy was 
on its way. For this reason, Staunton claimed that, “had the measure however been postponed 
for six months, it very probably would never have been adopted at all; for it would have 
become evident … that the peculiar ground for attempting to re-open a diplomatic intercourse 
with the court of Pekin … no longer existed”. 18  Because of these concerns, Staunton 
maintained that the main purpose of the Amherst mission was “not to propose any innovation, 
but merely to secure and consolidate … the ordinary commercial intercourse between the two 
countries”.19 In particular, he deemed it inappropriate to undertake the embassy “with any 
special view towards the attainment of additional privileges, such as the opening of a new port 
for the extension of our commerce, or any other of the wild and visionary projects”.20 Since 
those with local knowledge all agreed that the embassy was unlikely to obtain any additional 
benefits from the Qing court, Staunton explained the embassy’s paramount objective: “If it 
were found, that no good could be done; at least, to take especial care to do no harm – Not to 
lose any of the ground that the select committee had gained – not to frustrate the success of 
the line of policy they had adopted”.21  
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        In response to Staunton’s view, there is no evidence that Amherst or any member of the 
embassy raised a straightforward objection. Nevertheless, although some of them did show 
respect for the advice of these “China experts”, they were neither as committed to the 
instructions of the EIC, nor as convinced that no positive good could be achieved. Compared 
to the EIC representatives in the embassy, Amherst was less prepared for the difficulties that 
he might encounter. His relative optimism was reinforced by a favourable impression of the 
Chinese emperor. By 1816, both the British government and the EIC’s employees at Canton 
still entertained a perception of a somewhat enlightened Chinese sovereign.22 This impression 
was apparently derived from the opinions of early Catholic missionaries in China as well as 
from the views of some members of the Macartney embassy. Based on these positive views of 
the emperor’s character, the British, including the EIC’s employees at Canton, attributed the 
difficulties in Canton entirely to the misconduct of the local authorities. They believed that it 
was concealed from the emperor and, hence, once their oppressive actions against foreign 
merchants were communicated to His Imperial Majesty, the grievances in Canton would soon 
be redressed. Based on this belief, in the EIC’s instructions to Amherst, it was clearly stated 
that the anticipated outcome of the mission was “the establishment of the Company’s trade 
upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious arbitrary aggressions of the 
local Authorities, and under the protection of the Emperor, and the sanction of Regulations to 
be appointed by himself”.23 It can be seen that, at this stage, a favourable response from the 
Chinese sovereign had almost been taken for granted. This confidence placed upon the 
Jiaqing emperor, however, was considerably revised as the Amherst mission progressed. 
        The Amherst embassy to and from Beijing travelled on the Chinese mainland for 
approximately four months, but the most significant intercourse with the Qing government 
lasted only about twenty days. It is worth noting, however, that in the years before the 
Amherst embassy, the Qing court under the Jiaqing reign had been increasingly concerned 
9 
THE “INNER KOWTOW CONTROVERSY” 
 
 
about Britain’s naval ambitions in the China Seas. Particularly in 1802 and 1808, the British 
made two attempts to occupy Macao. These maritime expeditions, although unsuccessful, led 
the Guangdong government to represent the British as “the most harsh and cruel barbarians 
(zhufan zhong zuiwei jie’ao)” 24  who “live[d] by plunder (jielue weisheng)” 25  in its 
correspondence with the Jiaqing emperor. In addition, as soon as Amherst and his party came 
ashore in Dagu and embarked on the overland journey to Beijing, the British ships sailed back 
to Canton to await the embassy there. This act of sending away ships without first notifying 
the Chinese officials was taken as an insult to the Jiaqing emperor. It not only entailed that the 
embassy had to be escorted back to Canton though another route, which caused additional 
trouble and expense to the Qing court, but gave the British ships an opportunity to survey the 
Chinese coast, thus making the Jiaqing government more sensitive to the issue of British 
naval presence in Chinese waters. Perhaps for these reasons, compared to the Qianlong period, 
the Jiaqing court seemed even more determined to insist that the kowtow ceremony had to be 
performed by the British. For Amherst and his fellow Britons, this meant that the kowtow 
controversy was renewed as soon as their contact with the Chinese began. On the embassy’s 
way to Beijing, two rounds of negotiations were organised by the Qing court to test Amherst’s 
willingness to perform kowtow. As a result, the kowtow issue became not only a central cause 
of dispute between Britain and China, but a highly controversial subject within the Amherst 
embassy as well. 
        The first negotiation on the kowtow issue took place in Tianjin on 13 August 1816, four 
days after Amherst’s mission set foot on Chinese soil. An imperial banquet was prepared by 
two royal legates, Soo (Su Leng’e) and Kwang (Guang Hui), at the command of the Jiaqing 
emperor to provide the British with an opportunity to rehearse the kowtow ceremony. For this 
purpose, a table covered with yellow silk was laid out as a symbol of the Imperial Majesty’s 
presence and kowtow was expected to be paid to it by the British delegation. Although, 
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according to the instructions given by the British government, much latitude was left to the 
ambassador’s discretion with regard to the observation of Chinese court ritual, Amherst, at 
this stage, was determined not to prostrate himself before any representative of the sovereign. 
Instead, he paid some reverential low bows, without indicating whether or not he was going to 
perform kowtow before the emperor himself. 
        The second test of Amherst’s readiness to kowtow was conducted in Tongzhou, twelve 
miles from the capital. Two mandarins of very high rank, Duke Ho (He Shitai) and Duke Moo 
(Muke Deng’e),26 were deputed by the emperor to meet the British delegation. According to 
the accounts of the Amherst embassy, in the first of the two meetings held, the dukes adopted 
a haughty manner. They maintained that under no circumstances would the Qing court 
dispense with its established usages. Five days later, however, when the two parties met for 
the second time, the dukes’ attitude had become more courteous. Duke Ho first asked what 
the British side expected from this mission. After Amherst informed him of the various 
wishes entertained by the EIC and the British government, Duke Ho suggested that all these 
expectations might be satisfied once the British envoys agreed to perform kowtow.27 In this 
context, Amherst replied that some further deliberations were needed before he could provide 
a definite answer. When Amherst solicited opinions from Staunton and Ellis, an internal 
kowtow controversy transpired. Ellis, as well as Amherst himself, was more inclined to go 
ahead with the ceremony to secure Chinese trade concessions, while Staunton insisted that the 
Chinese would only respect the British if the British stuck to what they had said and done in 
the past. 
        It can be noticed that such conflicting views were advanced by the leaders of the 
Amherst embassy because of their different views of the mission’s ultimate objectives. For 
Amherst and Ellis, since the British government clearly stated that it was not advisable to “let 
any trifling punctilio stand in the way of the important benefits which may be obtained by 
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engaging the favourable disposition of the Emperor and his Ministers”, 28  their attitudes 
towards kowtow were more flexible. In particular, with Duke Ho’s hint of a favourable 
response in mind, they were of the opinion that too much emphasis on the ceremonial details 
would be injurious to the overall aims of the embassy. For this reason, a compromise on 
formality was considered not entirely unacceptable. Ellis maintained that,  
 
the sole chance of success to the ulterior objects of the embassy exists in 
producing a favourable impression upon the mind of the Emperor; and this can 
only be effected by complying with the particular usages of the court and nation, 
as far as a due sense of our own dignity, combined with considerations of policy, 
will permit.29 
 
Although, Ellis admitted that, the kowtow ceremony was certainly disagreeable to the sense of 
honour and propriety of every British visitor, “it could scarcely be deemed advisable to 
sacrifice the more important objects of the embassy to any supposed maintenance of dignity 
by insisting upon such a point of etiquette, in such a scene”. 30  
        Amherst, as head of the mission, basically concurred with Ellis in this view. He pointed 
out that, once the Qing court was offended, it was possible that “not only former grievances 
would not have been removed, but new misunderstandings would have arisen; and new evils 
would have been incurred”, whereas “a prospect was held out to us of positive good by a 
compliance with the Emperor’s wishes”.31 With such statements, it can be suggested that 
Amherst was in some sense attempting to show that he was not biased against either the EIC’s 
or the British government’s vision of the embassy’s ultimate objectives. On the one hand, he 
was worried that any insistence on not performing kowtow might induce the emperor to treat 
the EIC’s trade ungraciously in future. On the other hand, in order to achieve the “positive 
12 
THE “INNER KOWTOW CONTROVERSY” 
 
 
good” the government desired, he deemed it worthwhile to keep that prospect alive by making 
a reasonable concession to the Chinese emperor. 
        Ellis’s contention on the propriety of performing kowtow, as well as Amherst’s efforts to 
support this opinion, however, were not acceptable to Staunton, the second commissioner of 
the embassy. In conflict with the above views, Staunton asserted that, “judging from my 
general knowledge and experience of the Chinese character”, compromise on the court ritual 
“would not be likely to promote the attainment of any of the objects we have in view”.32 With 
respect to Amherst’s apprehensions about the EIC’s interests at Canton, he believed that 
refusal to kowtow would not cause any serious trouble to British interests in China. Again, 
based on his knowledge, Staunton maintained that, “It is not agreeable to the Chinese 
character to have recourse to violent measures, or to push matters to extremities unnecessarily, 
especially when they have (as I may safely say, in this case) no color or ground for 
proceeding”.33 To prove this, he referred to the Russian embassy in 1806. Although in that 
year the Russian ambassador had refused to kowtow and was hence rejected by the Jiaqing 
emperor, that event “did not occasion any interruption of the commercial intercourse between 
the two nations”.34 Moreover, with regard to the aim of achieving certain “positive good” 
beyond Canton, Staunton alleged that it was an unrealistic assumption that favourable actions 
would result from such a concession. He stated that,  
 
I am fully sensible of the importance of the objects of the present mission; but I 
cannot bring myself to believe that their attainment would be in the smallest 
degree be promoted by the compliance in question; and the mere reception, (it 
could be hardly be termed honorable reception) of the Embassy, would, I think, be 
too dearly purchased by such a sacrifice.35 
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Because of these considerations, Staunton came to the conclusion that kowtow should be 
avoided by all means, even though it might result in the rejection of the embassy. “Under such 
very singular circumstances”, he later wrote, “the mere ceremonies of a court reception, had 
they taken place, would have been nothing compared to the moral effect which the judiciously 
sustained proceedings of the British Mission would be calculated to produce”.36 
        Apart from these arguments based on his own “local” knowledge, it is interesting to 
observe how Staunton, in the minority of the embassy’s three-man leadership, managed to 
convince the other two of his viewpoint. When the answer to the kowtow question was shortly 
to be confirmed in Tongzhou, Staunton stressed that, because the embassy was sent out to 
China “solely and entirely for the sake of the local interests of the Company”, it was “not 
unnatural that the opinion of the persons connected with that interest should preponderate”.37 
Since this was a subject of extreme importance, not only were the attitudes of the envoys 
important, but the advice of the five EIC representatives who accompanied him should also be 
seriously considered, especially given the fact that they “possessed such acknowledged talents, 
judgment, and local experience, as must necessarily entitle their opinions to considerable 
weight”.38 On these grounds, Staunton was allowed to consult with these men individually. 
Unsurprisingly, all of them, either firmly or conditionally, turned out to agree with Staunton 
that it was unwise to comply with the kowtow ceremony.39 In this way, Staunton artfully 
turned his minority position in the dispute with Ellis and Amherst into a six-to-two advantage. 
Amherst was eventually persuaded to give up the idea of performing kowtow and, probably as 
a result, of winning the chance of achieving any “positive good”. 
        Although it sounds as if it was the embassy’s collective decision to proceed according to 
Staunton’s advice, deeper analysis into primary sources shows that, in fact, not everyone in 
the mission was convinced by Staunton’s arguments. In particular, previous scholarship has 
overlooked an underlying debate between Ellis and Staunton after the resolution not to 
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perform kowtow had been reached. From Staunton’s accounts, it can be discovered that he 
was anxious to prove that he had helped the embassy to make a correct decision in 1816. Even 
four decades later, Staunton was referring to various sources in his and others’ memoirs, in 
order to support this view. In particular, he highlighted some passages from one of Ellis’s 
books, in which Ellis had stated:  
 
I do not in the least blame myself for having surrendered my opinion to the 
experience of Sir George Staunton … I must confess that I could not have found 
another person to whose character and acquirements I would have preferred 
yielding the guidance of my actions.40 
 
This statement was taken by Staunton as proof that Ellis had willingly yielded his opinion to 
Staunton’s considerable local knowledge, but a wider and closer examination of their two 
accounts suggests that Ellis had never really accepted Staunton’s assertions. 
        First, although Ellis did indeed mention that he did not feel regret for complying with 
Staunton’s suggestion, his account of this was conveyed in a quite different tone to that which 
appeared in Staunton’s memoirs. Ellis, in fact, wrote in his official journal that: 
 
I have naturally felt deep regret at the prospect of being denied reception [at the 
Chinese court] from a continued refusal to comply with the wishes of the Chinese, 
and yet I do not in the least blame myself for having surrendered my opinion to 
the experience of Sir George Staunton. I am ready, when called upon to act, to 
yield crude notions to experienced opinion, but regarding the question as matter of 
speculation, my sentiments remain unchanged;41 
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To elaborate on this point, Ellis not only questioned “whether a contrary result would have 
been too dearly bought by sacrificing the distinction between nine prostrations of the head to 
the ground upon two knees, and nine profound bows upon one knee”,42 but maintained that, 
even without regard to the major objectives of the embassy, “I shall still be inclined to believe, 
that the irritation produced by protracted contest has been, in some measure, an obstacle to 
their favourable consideration”.43 
        Second, it can be seen from the evidence above that Ellis suggested that the inflexible 
stance which the British envoys decided to adopt in their negotiations was harmful to the 
success of the mission. This view produced another underlying debate between the second 
and the third commissioners. In contrast to what Ellis stated, it was Staunton’s conviction that, 
when dealing with the Chinese court, the British had not in the past been resolute enough, 
rather than being overly inflexible. Staunton maintained that, despite the fact that many 
people were in favour of the policy that questions relating to Chinese court ceremony should 
be determined on the spot, “the delay, which ensued in consequence, was fatal”.44 Ellis, in his 
journal, made it very clear that he was opposed to this view. He claimed that, “I cannot but 
regret this inevitable multiplication of subjects of ceremonial discussion, for I consider every 
victory upon these points as a diminution of the chances of success upon the more material 
objects of the embassy”.45 Although his opinion was not based on any prior knowledge or 
experience, concerning the kowtow question, it had always been Ellis’s belief that “the time 
employed in contending for the manner in which the embassy is to be received, and the 
temper generated by even successful inflexibility, are not calculated to dispose the mind of the 
Emperor, or his ministers, to listen favourably to propositions in which they do not see any 
reciprocal advantage”.46 Moreover, Ellis added that, “the dismissal of the embassy, without 
access being obtained to the imperial presence, would be a confirmation to the present and 
future Viceroys of Canton, that their own interest is the only check to their extortion and 
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injustice”.47 Because of these considerations, Ellis’s personal opinion on this issue was never 
influenced by Staunton’s efforts at persuasion. In concluding his explanation, Ellis stated 
distinctly that: 
 
should the reception or rejection of the embassy depend upon an adherence, on the 
present occasion, to the mode observed in the case of all former European 
ambassadors admitted to an audience, except Lord Macartney, I should have no 
hesitation in giving up the maintenance of the single exception as a precedent.48 
 
        Furthermore, Ellis cast a great deal of doubt on the value of the local knowledge which 
Staunton was so proud of possessing. The third commissioner was also sceptical about the 
allegedly “extensive acquaintance with the language”49 of the other “China experts”, who 
were simply, in his opinion, “more or less acquainted with the Chinese language”.50 Most 
important, Ellis argued that this local knowledge was obtained only from Canton. Since the 
situation in Beijing was vastly different, experiences gained in Canton might not necessarily 
be applicable elsewhere in China. For these reasons, Ellis claimed that he was “uninfluenced 
and unaided by local knowledge”,51 a statement which probably implies that, in his view, the 
so-called “local” knowledge, if insufficient, might rather mislead than assist the possessor’s 
judgment. To further support his perspective, Ellis took every opportunity to note the 
instances when Staunton failed to deliver the right message. For example, Ellis recorded that, 
in Tongzhou, the embassy was once unofficially informed by the Chinese side that the 
kowtow had already been dispensed with by the emperor. On hearing the news, “Sir George 
had no doubt that the point was conceded, and that we might be perfectly satisfied”.52 This 
belief soon proved to be utterly erroneous. As for Staunton’s interpretation that the kowtow 
implied political submission, Ellis was also suspicious. Instead, Ellis was more inclined to 
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perceive the kowtow as a mere formality and as part of the Chinese court’s normal 
conventions. Ellis noted that he was informed by a Chinese official that, “His Majesty … was 
not greater, nor we [the British] lower, by the performance; … the ko-tou did not constitute us 
tributaries”.53 In another conversation, Ellis reported that the embassy’s conducting officer, 
Chang (Zhang Wuwei), observed that: 
 
he was aware our resistance arose from a belief that the ko-tou [kowtow] was an 
admission of political dependence, but in this we were mistaken; that if he met a 
friend of superior rank, he went upon his knees to salute him; that however he 
neither considered himself a servant, nor did his friend pretend to be his master; 
the ko-tou was merely a court ceremony, and the Emperor considered it rude in 
the ambassador to refuse compliance.54 
 
Although these statements might well be untruthful allegations made by the Chinese 
authorities, it is interesting to note that Staunton and other EIC representatives never 
attempted to disprove these views, but chose to ignore them. Because of his lack of 
understanding of Chinese customs, Ellis was certainly unable to provide a more definite 
interpretation of the implications of performing or not performing the kowtow. His efforts to 
challenge Staunton’s “local inside knowledge” shown in this internal kowtow controversy, 
however, offered valuable perspectives on the existing degree of understanding of Chinese 
customs and practices by the Amherst embassy.  
        Because of Staunton’s strong and skilful opposition to the suggestion of complying with 
the kowtow ceremony, Amherst was eventually persuaded to “shew deference to an opinion 
[advanced by Staunton and] founded on long observation and on local experience”. 55 
Although the embassy was still allowed to proceed to Beijing, Amherst’s insistence on not 
18 
THE “INNER KOWTOW CONTROVERSY” 
 
 
performing kowtow finally irritated the Jiaqing emperor. 56  Only a few hours after the 
embassy’s arrival in Yuan-ming-yuan, the palace in which the imperial audience was 
supposed to be granted, the emperor issued an order for the embassy’s immediate departure 
from his court. The official proceedings of the Amherst mission were terminated.  
        It can be observed that, when the kowtow question arose, the slight difference between 
the expectations of the EIC and those of the British government for the Amherst embassy was 
greatly magnified. The outcome of this “inner kowtow controversy”, however, signified that 
the balance between Britain’s appeasing and its uncompromising attitude towards China was 
shifting away from the former and towards the latter. Unlike Macartney who generally spoke 
positively about the Qianlong emperor in 1793, Amherst and others in his embassy held the 
Jiaqing emperor responsible for the mission’s failure. Regardless of their different views 
about the kowtow ceremony, Amherst and Staunton agreed that “the personal character of the 
monarch”57 was the primary reason for the failure of their embassy. In this respect, Staunton 
maintained that, “the emperor’s violence and precipitation must … be considered as the main 
cause of what has happened. … his conduct throughout has certainly been ungracious in the 
extreme, and totally unlike that of his predecessor, upon the occasion of the former 
embassy”. 58  In a similar vein, Amherst argued that, “my want of success is not to be 
attributed to want either of zeal or discretion in the performance of my duty”.59 The real 
reason for the mission’s failure was, Amherst believed, that the Jiaqing emperor, “whose 
reign has been frequently and very lately disturbed by insurrections”, was less ready to 
“dispense with outward fame of respect than his Father, whose reign was long and victorious, 
and who, being firm in the possession of real power and authority, might attach less 
consequence to any shew of external homage”.60  
        In particular, the emperor’s ejection of the embassy from Beijing, immediately after a 
exhausting overnight journey, ignited so much indignation across the entire British delegation 
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that no one was willing to suppress his anger. John Davis, one of the translators and the EIC 
representatives, claimed that, “This certainly was a barbarous, not to say brutal, measure, 
considering that we had only just arrived from a most fatiguing night journey. … The insult 
offered had been so gross”.61 The naturalist Clarke Abel, who found it impossible to explain 
what had occurred “in any probable chain of cause and effect”, wrote that, “We could only 
conjecture that we had been hurried to and from Yuen-min-yuen, and subjected to all kinds of 
indignity and inconvenience, to suit the will of a capricious despot”.62 Moreover, by contrast 
with the Macartney mission, the Amherst embassy’s criticism of the Qing court centred 
almost exclusively on the emperor himself, rather than on any of his mandarins. These British 
travellers believed that every transaction between the embassy and the Chinese government 
was manipulated by the Jiaqing emperor himself, whereas all his mandarins were simply 
fulfilling the duties imposed upon them. Henry Hayne noted in this regard that, “We all felt 
much for the situation of the Mandarins attached to us, having had great reason to be 
perfectly satisfied with their whole conduct toward us, and at the same time extremely 
zealous in the cause of their Emperor”.63 Ellis fully concurred with Hayne on this point. He 
maintained that, “we must consider ourselves fortunate in the Mandarins with whom we had 
to transact business … the rupture must be attributed to the personal character of the Emperor, 
who is capricious, weak, and timid, and the combined effect of these feelings will account for 
his pertinacity”.64 
        This production of an unfavourable image of the Chinese sovereign, moreover, did not 
cease with the dismissal of Amherst’s mission. In the beginning of the embassy’s return 
journey from Beijing to Canton, Amherst was concerned that the emperor’s displeasure 
would result in much inconvenience for his embassy. Yet, upon his return to Tongzhou, 
Amherst received a visit from Legates Soo and Kwang, who informed him of the emperor’s 
proposal for a partial exchange of presents. This attempt to keep on good terms with the 
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British, together with the kindness with which the mission was treated during the rest of its 
return journey, was considered by Amherst as “a sort of reparation for its abrupt dismissal 
from Yuen-min-yuen”.65 Nevertheless, since neither an explanation for the rejection nor a 
clearly stated willingness to preserve good relations with Britain was communicated, the 
belated graciousness of the Chinese sovereign did not generate much good will on the part of 
the British. On the contrary, the Jiaqing emperor’s quick change of mind was seen as proof of 
both his caprice and his weakness, as well as an example of his inconsistent mode of 
government. Ellis, for instance, stressed that: 
 
This weak and capricious monarch, soon after the flagrant outrage had been 
committed under the impulse of angry disappointment, may be supposed to have 
become alarmed at the consequences of his own violence, and the habitual notions 
of decorum belonging to Chinese character and usage resuming their influence, 
produced the partial reparation.66 
 
Although this interpretation was not founded on solid evidence, to the British, it was the most 
credible explanation of what had transpired on the Chinese side. 
        In light of the perceived unfavourable and unreliable character of the Jiaqing emperor, as 
well as some experiences they gained during the return journey from Beijing to Canton, 
members of the Amherst mission analysed the lessons they had learned in China. As a result, 
some key ideas left by the Macartney embassy regarding how to improve Britain’s relations 
with China were revised. First, the grounds for sending another complimentary embassy to 
China were seriously challenged. Amherst, based on what he had learned throughout the 
journey, suggested that China’s current financial circumstances, combined with the character 
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of the present emperor, rendered such a mission unwelcome to the Chinese. He maintained 
that, 
 
The disordered state of the Imperial Finances would make it an object to save the 
expense attending the transport of a numerous company of persons from one 
extremity of the Empire to the other; and the same reason added, I believe, to the 
personal fears and jealousies of the Emperor would probably retrench a great part 
of the train of any future ambassador.67 
 
Ellis also pointed out that it was actually not sensible to attempt to strengthen Britain’s 
commercial links with China by dispatching another embassy. He contended that,  
 
Royal embassies, avowedly complimentary, but really directed to commercial 
objects, are perhaps, in themselves, somewhat anomalous, and are certainly very 
opposite, not only to Chinese feelings, but even to those of all Eastern nations; 
among whom trade, although fostered as a source of revenue, is never reputed 
honourable.68 
 
In light of such advice given by the ambassador and the third commissioner, we can 
understand why the Amherst embassy did indeed become the last mission of its kind that 
Britain sent out to China. 
        Second, from their daily contacts with officials of the Chinese government, members of 
the Amherst embassy accumulated some useful knowledge on how to deal with the Chinese 
authorities in practice. In particular, it was discovered that, under most circumstances, in 
order to achieve an objective, the best way was simply to ignore government authorities and 
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not request formal approval before proceeding to business. For example, as had frequently 
happened on their return voyage from Beijing to Canton, “whenever we [the British] began 
by soliciting leave to walk into the country or to look at anything, our request was almost 
invariably refused”.69 The most effective approach, however, proved to be to “go straight 
forward, without putting difficulties into the people’s heads, by seeming to imagine any 
permission necessary”.70 For this reason, Hayne was convinced that “by experience we have 
found beyond a doubt, that to obtain an end in China, is to ask no question, and if there is no 
real objection, it will pass unnoticed”.71 Experience had also shown that on the occasions 
when British interests were neglected, such as when daily supplies were deficient, it was 
important for the British to express their demands in a resolute manner. Davis maintained in 
this regard that it was a well-proven fact that every time the British remonstrated strongly, 
their grievances were not only soon redressed, but were, in most cases, handled with greater 
care. Hence, in order to produce a favourable response, a “determined step was the more 
requisite”.72 
        Finally, the various experiences drawn from the minor aspects of the embassy seemed to 
have influenced some of the subsequent tactics which British observers proposed should be 
adopted in future British-Chinese relations. Most significant, according to the suggestions 
coming from the members of the Amherst mission, was the advice to promote a more 
powerful and steadfast image of Britain in the imperial court of China. Ellis, for instance, 
suggested that if “it still be deemed advisable to assist our commerce by political 
intercourse”,73 the British authorities should look to their possessions in Hindostan and Nepal, 
whose boundaries proximate to Tibet, and use “the supreme government of Bengal as the 
medium of that intercourse”.74 By this means, he expected that  
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there the representative of armed power will encounter its fellow; and if ever 
impression is to be produced at Pekin, it must be from an intimate knowledge of 
our political and military strength, rather than from the gratification produced in 
the Emperor’s mind by the reception of an embassy on Chinese terms, or the 
moral effect of justifiable resistance terminating in rejection.75 
 
John Macleod advocated even more coercive measures. He wrote with assurance that, “The 
removal of our trade for a single year, and the appearance of a few of our lightest cruisers on 
their coasts, would throw the whole of this celestial empire into confusion”.76 Although there 
is some similarity between this statement and Macartney’s famous aggressive comments in 
1794,77 it is worth noting that, unlike Macartney, no preference for a policy of forbearance 
was supported by Macleod. On the contrary, next to the above passage, Macleod quoted a 
remark by Krusenstern, a Russian navigator who had experienced similar vexation in China 
and had alleged that “the forbearance and mistaken lenity of the greater civilized powers have 
emboldened these savages, not only to consider as barbarians all Europeans, but actually to 
treat them as such”.78 With reference to this statement, it can be observed that not only was 
China being viewed as an isolated “other” from the civilised European countries, but 
Macleod was implying that the wrong approach had been adopted by western nations in their 
relations with China. Although plans to demonstrate British power and resolution were not 
yet under serious consideration at this stage, the previous effort to curry favour with the 
Chinese emperor had been shown to be ineffective. 
        In conclusion, although, just like in 1793, the Amherst mission failed to achieve its 
original objectives, this embassy was by no means an unimportant event in the historiography 
of Sino-British relations. Neither was the result of the embassy a mere repetition of the fate of 
Macartney’s mission. If we examine closely the complexity of its launch and its proceedings, 
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as well as the reflections left by its participants, we can find that the Amherst embassy 
actually encountered a range of new situations which did not exist in the case of the 
Macartney embassy. In particular, the variance between the expectations of the EIC and the 
British government for the mission did not seem to be a notable factor in the beginning, but 
its significance was considerably enlarged as the Sino-British kowtow dispute re-emerged. In 
this context, Staunton, the leading EIC representative whose “local inside knowledge” was 
supposed to assist Amherst in achieving the diplomatic goals of the embassy, set off an “inner 
kowtow controversy” which proved critical to the outcome of the mission. As a consequence 
of this internal struggle, conducted mainly between Staunton and the rest of the embassy’s 
leadership, Amherst had to yield to Staunton’s “experience-based” assessment of the situation 
and adopt an unbending stance which resulted in the dismissal of the mission. To explain this 
unpleasant outcome, however, the importance of the “inner kowtow controversy” to the 
failure of the embassy was significantly (perhaps also deliberately) downplayed by both sides. 
Instead of suggesting that it might have been their fault, these men, who were either primarily 
or partly responsible for this collective decision, chose to focus on the personal character of 
the Jiaqing emperor, who they maintained to be extremely capricious and arbitrary. On the 
basis of this largely invented image, leading members of the Amherst embassy were able to 
justify the idea that the means of dispatching complimentary embassies to China was 
problematic per se, while a demonstration of Britain’s power and firmness would be a better 
way to conduct Britain’s future relations with China. In this sense, we can find that the 
Amherst mission’s significance to the development of Sino-British relations was undoubtedly 
profound. As subsequent history has shown, in consequence of this embassy, or more 
specifically of the “inner kowtow controversy”, no royal embassy was sent to the Qing court 
again and the British government ceased to pursue the policy of appeasing the Chinese 
emperor as suggested by Macartney. Britain’s previously deferential posture in its relations 
25 
THE “INNER KOWTOW CONTROVERSY” 
 
 
with China was beginning to give way to a more hard-line approach in the decades to come. 
It can be argued that this change of attitude initiated in 1817, which may not have been 
possible if the outcome of the “inner kowtow controversy” were different, helped to lay the 
foundations for the deterioration of Sino-British relations that was apparent by the 1830s. 
Although we cannot maintain that the Amherst embassy led directly to the Opium War, the 
seeds of the Sino-British hostilities can definitely be found in this episode in which the opium 
issue was not yet a major concern to both sides. The open conflict with China in the early 
1840s would probably not have been as imaginable or as acceptable without the critical 
observations advanced by the Amherst mission in the wake of this “inner kowtow 
controversy”. 
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